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Caring Society v Canada: Neoliberalism, Social Reproduction, and
Indigenous Child Welfare
KATE BEZANSON*
En janvier 2016, dans la décision de la Société de soutien à l’enfance et à la famille des
Premières Nations du Canada (Société de soutien), le Tribunal canadien des droits de la
personne a constaté que le gouvernement canadien avait effectué de la discrimination
envers les enfants autochtones vivant dans les réserves, relativement à l’octroi de
financement pour la protection de l’enfance autochtone et pour certains autres services.
La décision Société de soutien porte sur le travail quotidien et générationnel nécessaire
dans une société pour assurer la survie sociale, culturelle et économique. C’est ce que les
économistes féministes appellent « reproduction sociale ». Cet article pose une question
fondamentale quant à cette décision : devrait-on interpréter les principales questions
constitutionnelles qu’elle soulève comme des contestations ou une crise relative à la
provision de soins?
In January 2016, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in First Nations Child and
Family Caring Society of Canada v Canada (Caring Society) found that the Canadian
government had discriminated against Indigenous children on reserve in its provision of
funding for child welfare and certain other services. Caring Society is a case about the
daily and generational work that is needed in any society to ensure social, cultural, and
economic survival, or what feminist political economists call social reproduction. This
article thus asks a central question of this decision: are the main constitutional issues it
raises best understood as contests over, and crises of, care?

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE January 2016 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s (CHRT or the
Tribunal) decision in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v Canada
(Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development).1 In this landmark case, the CHRT found
that the Canadian government had discriminated against First Nations2 children on reserve in its
provision of funding for child welfare and certain other services.

*

Kate Bezanson, PhD is Associate Professor and Chair of the Sociology Department at Brock University. She is also
a Constitutional Law LLM student at Osgoode. The author wishes to thank Ron Stevenson, Jana Promislow,
Andrew Lokan, Jennifer Malabar, Brendan Miller, and Joanne Wright for their comments and insights on this topic
and paper.
1
2016 CHRT 2 [Caring Society].
2
There is confusion and elision when it comes to the terms Aboriginal, First Nations, and Indigenous. In the
decision under consideration in this paper, the term First Nations is used primarily as the Tribunal is referencing the
provision of child welfare services in First Nations communities on reserve. The term Aboriginal is used in the
decision and more generally with reference to its constitutional inclusion of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples.
In this paper and in keeping with international conventions, I use the term Indigenous as a collective referent for
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples where possible, but deploy the term First Nations in relation to matters
related to child welfare on reserve.
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Caring Society is, at its core, a case about what feminist political economists call social
reproduction.3 At the broadest level, social reproduction refers to the daily and generational work
that is needed in any society to ensure social, cultural, and economic survival.4 Law and social
policy are frequently called upon to grapple with the “fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of
everyday life”5 that is social reproduction, yet often do so inadequately such that questions of
culture, gender, racialization, income, and power are not well incorporated.6 In a post-Truth and
Reconciliation Commission era, this case offers an opportunity to critically assess questions such
as: what constitutes care, who pays for it, in what amounts, provided by whom, with which
words, in which language, with what kind of memory, and in which kinds of families? It
illuminates processes and sites of struggle, including at the macro level in social, legal, political,
and economic legacies and dynamics of settler colonialism, neoliberalism, and federalism; at the
meso level, in and among institutions, policies, state/agency/band/social work actors; and at the
micro level, in the day-to-day (usually gendered and unpaid) transmission of culture, norms,
socialization (including to racism) as well as love, support, and material/physical care.
This article asks a central question of the Caring Society decision: are the main
constitutional issues it raises (policy and funding jurisdiction/obligations and a sui generis
relationship) best understood as contests over, and crises of, care? It proceeds in three stages.
First, it reviews and contextualizes the CHRT ruling and subsequent compliance orders. Second,
it suggests that since the inception of the First Nations Child and Family Services (FNCFS)
Program in 1990, the struggle over child welfare on reserve has occurred concurrently with an
escalating neoliberalization of social and economic policy. This neoliberalization process has
dovetailed positively with greater community/First Nations based control of service provision,
and negatively with a broader trend toward a downloading and individualizing of social risks.
This neoliberalization occurred along with an expansion of a culture of accountability in a
context that either reduced, or made increasingly conditional, the provision of material and social
supports. Third, it applies the lens of social reproduction to the case, showing how the conflicts
3

Nancy Fraser, “Contradictions of Capital and Care” (2016) 100 New Left Rev 99; Kate Bezanson, “Return of the
Nightwatchman State? Federalism, Social Reproduction and Social Reproduction in Conservative Canada” in Katie
Meehan & Kendra Strauss, eds, Precarious Worlds: Contested Geographies of Social Reproduction (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2015) 25 [Bezanson, “Return of the Nightwatchman State?”]; Isabella Bakker, “Social
Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy” (2007) 12:4 New Political Economy 541;
Shirin M. Rai & Georgina Waylen, eds, New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy (Abindgon, UK: Routledge,
2014); Diane Elson, “Economic Crises from the 1980s to the 2010s: A Gender Analysis” in Shirin M. Rai &
Georgina Waylen, eds, New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014) 189.
4
Kate Bezanson, “Mad Men Social Policy: Families, Social Reproduction, and Childcare in a Conservative Canada”
in Rachel Langford, Susan Prentice & Patrizia Albanese, eds, Caring for Children: Social Movements and Public
Policy in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017) 19 [Bezanson, “Mad Men Social
Policy”]; Antonella Picchio, Social Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour Market (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992).
5
Cindy Katz, “Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction” (2001) 33:4 Antipode 709 at 711.
6
While areas such as family law and income assistance may be the most obvious instances of the intersections of a
social reproduction analysis and law, this theoretical lens has broad and pressing application including in relation to
land and title claims for Indigenous peoples. For example, in the ground-breaking case Tsilhqot’in Nation v British
Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in], the Supreme Court considered robust anthropological, historical, and oral
history accounts of cultural practices and land usages. This evidence, while sufficient to unanimously grant
Aboriginal title, missed a crucial nuance that norms, habits, practices, customs, and languages are transmitted via
(often gendered) individual, family, and group practices, and are eroded when the conditions of social reproduction
are directly or indirectly undermined, and importantly, are not fixed but adaptive and thus change over time.
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over social reproduction are shifted: among levels and branches of government and crystallized
in the misapplication of Jordan’s Principle;7 among child welfare service providers, agencies,
and agents; and within families, communities, and foster care providers. The lens of social
reproduction here illuminates both the multi-scalar and multigenerational effects of neocolonialism and its practices, and a potential for law and social policy to attend to its limits and
failures. It concludes by suggesting that Caring Society reflects profound substantiated claims for
equality,8 material redress and recognition, with implications for the goal of reconciliation.

I. CARING SOCIETY V CANADA
Although the Tribunal issued its decision in early 2016, Caring Society remains only partially
finished. The initial complaint was filed in 2007, and was referred by the Canadian Human
Rights Commission to the CHRT in 2008.9 In 2012, the Federal Court10 set aside the CHRT’s11
2011 dismissal of the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, and in 2013 the Federal Court of
Appeal dismissed the government’s appeal of that decision.12 A newly constituted CHRT panel
was formed in 2012, and it ruled that the complaint would be heard. Allegations of retaliation
were added to the complaint in 2012, and in June 2015, the CHRT panel found the allegations of

7

Jordan’s Principle is a “child-first” principle that requires that whomever is contacted first (provincial/federal
government or department) pays for a public service that is available to children in that province, and reimbursement
is sorted out later. See Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 351.
8
In studying this and related cases, I have wondered why this claim was brought to this tribunal rather than as a
section 15 Charter case. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11, s 15. There are benefits and drawbacks to this important case having been heard at the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal. The benefits of a tribunal include lower costs, greater accessibility, greater flexibility in evidence
rules and procedures, ostensibly time efficiencies, specialization in human rights jurisprudence, and some evidence
(though no consensus) that the test for discrimination may be met more easily under the Canadian Human Rights
Act than under section 15 of the Charter. See e.g. Claire Mummé, “At the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How
the Human Rights Codes Overtook the Charter in Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 JL & Equality
103. It is also worth noting that the repeal of section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act in 2008 meant that, as of
2010, federal and First Nations governments were no longer shielded from discrimination complaints. Section 67
read: “nothing in this Act affects any provision of the Indian Act or any provision made under or pursuant to that
Act.” See An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act, SC 2008, c 30. Among the most important detriments
is that the results of a case at the Human Rights Tribunal level are not binding on courts, though notice is generally
taken of such findings. See Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin
Press, 2013) at 16. The Caring Society case is thus not directly in conversation with developments in other areas of
constitutional case law involving Indigenous peoples in Canada, nor are the substantive equality issues it raises
given a formal voice in reconciliatory dialogues flowing from such cases.
9
The Canadian Human Rights Commission hears complaints related to discrimination under the Canadian Human
Rights Act, has a process of investigation, offers mediation where possible, and where not possible, refers cases to
the CHRT for consideration. The CHRT conducts formal hearings and renders decisions based on evidence and
relevant law. See Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, online: <chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/index-en.html> [perma.cc/F6FPPMRY].
10
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canada (AG), 2012 FC 445 [Caring Society FC].
11
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Assembly of First Nations v Attorney General of
Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2011 CHRT 4.
12
Canada (AG) v Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2013 FCA 75 [Caring Society FCA]; Caring Society, supra
note 2 at para 8.

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018

154

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 28 [2018], Art. 8

retaliation to be partially substantiated.13 The CHRT hearing on the complaint commenced in
early 2013 and formally ended in late 2014, but the CHRT retains jurisdiction until orders are
implemented. Since its decision was issued in January of 2016, Indigenous and Northern Affairs
Canada (INAC)14 has been found to be in violation of portions of the orders in the original ruling
and three compliance orders have been issued. 15 Although the spring 2016 federal budget
increased spending to FNCFS, additional new funding was announced in the summer of 2016,
and a motion was unanimously passed in the House of Commons in November supporting
compliance with the CHRT ruling, the complainants’ submission to the CHRT in December
2016 alleging a continued failure to comply fully with orders related to this case suggests that
these measures are inadequate.16 Despite its initial claim that it would not seek judicial review of
the ruling,17 the most recent non-compliance order, issued May 26, 2017, was appealed by the
Government of Canada on June 23rd, and later repealed.18
The issues raised in this decision and the difficulties in compliance with its orders reflect
both the complexity of the policy questions addressed and the insufficiency of legal processes to
adequately redress materially or symbolically the weight of internally colonialist historical
legacies. The policy questions are complex because child and family services is an area of social
policy that addresses sometimes supportive, sometimes life-altering, and sometimes lifethreatening issues ranging from counselling support, to domestic violence, to removal of a child
from a family home. The policy questions are also complex because although Aboriginal Affairs
13

First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2015 CHRT 14.
14
Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada (INAC or IAND) was renamed AANDC in 2011, and then
changed to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) in 2015. See Zi-Ann Lum, “Liberals’ Indigenous
Affairs Name Change Called ‘Important’ Symbolic Gesture”, Huffington Post (4 November 2015), online:
<huffingtonpost.ca/2015/11/04/aboriginal-affairs-name-change_n_8475496.html> [perma.cc/RQ5M-8GEA]. In this
paper, I refer to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), its name when the Caring Society decision was
issued, where possible. In August 2017, INAC was dissolved and two ministries—Indigenous Services (“responsible
for providing services for non-self-governing communities”) and Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern
Affairs—were created. See Kathleen Harris, “Trudeau Remakes Indigenous Affairs Ministry, Adds 2 Rookies to
Cabinet”, CBC News (28 August 2017), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/seamus-oregan-veterans-affairs-minister1.4264773>.
15
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 10 [Caring Society 2016 CHRT 10]; First Nations Child and
Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 16; First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General
of Canada (representing the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), 2017 CHRT 14.
16
Canada, Ministry of Finance, Budget 2016: Growing the Middle Class (Ottawa: Ministry of Finance, 2016) at
139; Canada, Government of Canada, “Joint Statement from the Minister of Health and the Minister of Indigenous
and Northern Affairs on Responding to Jordan's Principle” (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 25 July 2016). See
House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 102 (1 November 2016) at 14:35. Motion 296 in support of
Jordan’s Principle also passed unanimously in the House of Commons in 2007. See House of Commons, Votes and
Proceedings, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 27 (12 December 2007). The December submissions filed by the Caring
Society, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Nishnawbe Aski Nation related specifically to the failure to
implement the orders in Caring Society 2016 CHRT 10, supra note 15 at para 33 relating to Jordan’s Principle.
17
CBC News, “Federal Government Won't Appeal Ruling that Found it Discriminated Against Children on
Reserves”, CBC News (22 February 2016), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-government-not-appeal-childrenreserves-1.3458969>.
18
Kristy Kirkup, “Ottawa Seeks ‘Clarity’ on Tribunal Findings on First Nations Health”, Maclean’s (24 June 2017),
online:
<macleans.ca/news/canada/ottawa-seeks-clarity-on-tribunal-findings-on-first-nations-health>
[perma.cc/4XHY-9AS3].

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol28/iss1/8

155

Bezanson: Issue 1: Caring Society v Canada: Neoliberalism, Social Reproduct

and Northern Development Canada (AANDC at the time, later changed to INAC) 19 funds
services delivered by agencies or provincial/territorial governments, it does not directly provide
those services. Additionally, child and family services necessarily exist within a range of related
human services such as health and education, which are governed and administered under
provincial/territorial jurisdiction. The interplay of agencies, branches, and levels of government
results in confusion about responsibility and at times, denial of service. Importantly to this case,
the level and quality of services and supports, both directly within the purview of the federal
government’s FNCFS Program, and complementary to it, have been found to be woefully
insufficient by numerous external experts for many years.20
The central question in Caring Society was whether, under section 5 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act,21 AANDC/INAC discriminated on the basis of race and/or national/ethnic
origin in its provision of child and family services on reserve. 22 The complainants, the First
Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada (Caring Society) and the Assembly of First
Nations (AFN), alleged that AANDC/INAC provided “inequitable and insufficient funding”23
for child and family services. The Tribunal found:
AANDC is involved in the provision of child and family services to First Nations on
reserves and in the Yukon; that First Nations are adversely impacted by the provision
of those services by AANDC, and, in some cases, denied those services as a result of
AANDC’s involvement; and; that race and/or national or ethnic origin are a factor in
those adverse impacts or denial.24
The Tribunal concluded that “these adverse impacts perpetuate the historical disadvantage and
trauma suffered by Aboriginal people, in particular as a result of the Residential Schools
system.”25 It ordered that AANDC/INAC cease “its discriminatory practices and reform the First
Nations Child and Family Services (FNCFS) Program,” 26 and to “cease applying its narrow
definition of Jordan’s Principle and to take measures to immediately implement the full meaning
and scope of the principle.”27

19

See supra note 14 regarding the recent splitting of INAC into two ministries.
See John Loxley, Fred Wien & Cindy Blackstock, Bridging Econometrics and First Nations Child and Family
Service Agency Funding: Phase One Report (Vancouver: First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada,
2004); Cindy Blackstock et al, Wen:de: We Are Coming to the Light of Day (Ottawa: First Nations Child and Family
Caring Society of Canada, 2005); John Loxley et al, Wen:de: The Journey Continues (Ottawa: First Nations Child
and Family Caring Society of Canada, 2005); Auditor General of Canada, May 2008 Report of the Auditor General
of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 4, First Nations Child and Family Services Program—Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008) [AG Canada
2008 Report]; Auditor General of Canada, 2011 Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons, Chapter 4, Programs for First Nations on Reserves (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 2011) [AG Canada 2011 Report].
21
Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [CHRA].
22
Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 6.
23
Ibid.
24
Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 28.
25
Ibid at para 459.
26
Caring Society 2016 CHRT 10, supra note 15 at para 2.
27
Ibid.
20
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In determining that there was a prima facie (on its face, or assumed to be true unless
proven otherwise) case of discrimination, the Tribunal considered issues of jurisdiction,
definitions and quality of service provision, and more broadly, the Crown’s constitutional and
fiduciary duty with Indigenous peoples. 28 These aspects of this decision merit deeper
consideration.

A. JURISDICTION AND SERVICE
Because this complaint falls under section 5 of the CHRA, questions of jurisdiction and service—
who pays for and delivers what—were central features of this case. 29
28

The issue of requiring comparator evidence to substantiate a claim of discrimination under human rights
legislation was extensively considered by the Tribunal. AANDC/INAC argued that because no evidence was
provided by the complainants pertaining to provincial/territorial budgets and funding models, it was not possible to
conclude that discrimination occurred and amounted to perceived differences, rather than substantiated ones. This
argument was rejected by the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the CHRT. See Caring Society FC,
supra note 10; Caring Society FCA, supra note 12; and First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et
al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2012 CHRT 17. The
Federal Court, following Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 12 [Withler], noted that a requirement of a mirror
comparator group in every case would mean that “First Nations people will be limited in their ability to seek the
protection of the Act [CHRA] if they believe that they have been discriminated against in the provision of a
government service on the basis of their race or national or ethnic origin.” See Caring Society FC, supra note 10 at
para 337. The Federal Court of Appeal extended this analysis, following Moore v British Columbia (Education),
2012 SCC 61 [Moore] and Quebec (AG) v A, 2013 SCC 5 [Quebec v A], suggesting that substantive equality is
imperiled if the existence of a comparator group is accepted as determinative in a finding of discrimination. See
Caring Society FCA, supra note 12 at para 18. Recalling Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 1 SCR
143 at 164, the Tribunal cautioned against a formalistic approach to equality: “every difference in treatment between
individuals under the law will not necessarily result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may
frequently produce serious inequality.” The Tribunal challenged AANDC/INAC’s assertion that no comparator
evidence had been presented, and delineated at paragraphs 329 to 339 submissions that supported a discrimination
finding in funding and service provision on and off reserve. See Caring Society, supra note 2.
29
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was recently granted in March 2017 for a CHRT case raising similar issues.
See Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada (AG), 2016 FCA 200 [CHRC v Canada]. It seeks clarity on
whether specific discriminatory federal legislation must be challenged via the Charter rather than as a human rights
complaint, potentially shifting cases such as Caring Society outside of the purview of the CHRT. CHRC v Canada
concerns the applications of two different parties in two separate CHRT cases (Andrews et al v Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada, 2013 CHRT 21 [Andrews]; and Matsen et al v Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2013 CHRT 13
[Matsen]) regarding status under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. Ruling on both simultaneously, the Federal Court
and the Federal Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the Matsen and Andrews decisions on the grounds of
reasonableness. See Canadian Human Rights Commission v Attorney General of Canada, 2015 FC 398; CHRC v
Canada. CHRC v Canada is pertinent for Caring Society because it has the potential to clarify the Court’s view on
cases where: (1) a service may not available to the general public (a claim made by Canada in Caring Society, supra
note 2); (2) what constitutes a service is in question; and (3) whether discrimination in a legislative scheme is the
purview of a tribunal or if it should be subject to a potentially more rigorous section 1 Charter test. This case is thus
an opportunity for the Court to provide guidance on whether the CHRA (a statute with quasi-constitutional status)
can be used to challenge “denials of government benefits that are based on discriminatory criteria written into
federal legislation.” See Memorandum of Argument in support of the application for Leave to Appeal of the
Applicant, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, in CHRC v Canada at para 1. In relation to the Caring Society
case, CHRC v Canada may provide guidance on the questions that the Caring Society decision hinged on, that is
whether funding is a service and what constitutes a service customarily available to the general public. However,
while taking note of the significant similarity in questions raised, the Caring Society case does not involve a denial
of benefits because of legislated eligibility criteria. Moreover, the provinces and territories, unlike the federal
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Section 5 of the CHRA reads:
It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or
accommodation customarily available to the general public
(a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service, facility or
accommodation to any individual, or
(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual,
on a prohibited ground of discrimination.30
Establishing provision and/or denial of services along with adverse differentiation required a
finding that AANDC/INAC provided a service and not simply funding. Under section 91(24) of
the Constitution Act, 1867, child welfare services for First Nations children and families living
on reserve and in the Yukon are funded by AANDC/INAC via the FNCFS Program.31 These
services are provided by provincially mandated First Nations Child and Family Services
Agencies, and to a lesser extent, by provinces and non-Aboriginal service providers. Child
welfare is, however, governed by provincial legislation and standards.
Following Kelso v The Queen and Bitonti v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia, the Tribunal found that funding can constitute a service, citing from Kelso that “the
government’s right to allocate resources cannot override a statute such as the Canadian Human
Rights Act.” 32 Further, it concluded that the on reserve child and family services benefit provided
by AANDC/INAC constitutes much more than funding. The more-than-funding relationship,
which is in many ways at the heart of the discriminatory practice, involves policy directives and
funding agreements.
Different policy regimes govern First Nations child and family service agencies. Under
the FNCFS Program, two primary funding approaches exist: Directive 20-1 applies in British
Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Yukon Territory; and the
Enhanced Prevention Focused Approach (EPFA) applies in Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec,
Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island.33 A unique cost-sharing agreement between Ontario
and AANDC/INAC—the 1965 Indian Welfare Agreement—provides for child and family
services on First Nations reserves. 34 The funding approaches—their form and amount of
funding—hem and shape the services provided to First Nations children and families on reserve
and in the Yukon Territory. They shape practice.35

government, do have legislative and regulatory frameworks governing child welfare; federal child welfare funding
aims to provide comparable levels of, and compliance with, sub-national programs. Thus, the outcome of CHRC v
Canada may not apply tidily to Caring Society.
30
Supra note 21, s 5.
31
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5, s 91(24) [Constitution
Act, 1867].
32
Kelso v The Queen, [1981] 1 SCR 199 [Kelso]; Bitonti et al v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia et al, 1999 BCHRT 63; Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 42.
33
Prior to 2007, when the complaint was first filed with the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Directive 20-1
governed all provinces (save Ontario) and the Yukon (Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 44). Since then, some
have transitioned to the EPFA.
34
Similar agreements are also in place in Alberta, British Columbia, and the Yukon. See Caring Society, supra note
2 at para 46.
35
Blackstock et al, supra note 20 at 21.
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These policy regimes have significant and longstanding problems, extensively
documented in joint AANDC/INAC/Assembly of First Nations/FNCFS agency reports,
independent reports by the Auditor General of Canada, and House of Commons Standing
Committee reports since 2000.36 These reports find that the principal objective of the FNCFS
Program, which is “to assist First Nations in providing access to culturally sensitive child and
family services in their communities, and to ensure that the services provided to them are
comparable to those available to other provincial residents in similar circumstances,”37 including
services that aim to “increase the ability and capacity of First Nations families to remain together
and to support the needs of First Nations children in their parental homes and communities,”38
has been consistently unrealized under the FNCFS Program. Even following joint and external
review, the EPFA program that serves as a replacement agreement for Directive 20-1, retains its
central flaws, although funding is increased. The Tribunal delineated the myriad shortcomings of
Directive 20-1, the EPFA, and the Ontario agreement, including: inflexible funding formulas that
are generally unresponsive to variance in community needs based on size or service demand and
volume; cost of living freezes and a failure to adjust to inflation and current wage levels;
inadequate funding in almost every social policy jurisdiction AANDC/INAC controls; limited or
absent compliance with provincial/territorial standards and legislation; and a failure to fund legal
counsel for band representation in child removal cases.39
Three issues are particularly important to the finding of discrimination in service
provision, and have racialized dimensions: first, AANDC/INAC’s funding structure incentivizes
removing children and placing them into care rather than focusing on prevention and support;
second, AANDC/INAC has interpreted Jordan’s Principle narrowly, resulting in service delays
and denials to First Nations children in care; and third, there is inadequate coordination and
support between the FNCFS Program, the suite of other social programs AANDC/INAC offers,
and other social and human services.
In the first instance, the Tribunal found that insufficient fixed budgets for prevention and
family support, and a schema of full cost, dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for taking children
into care, created a distortion that made it financially and practically more feasible to remove
children from their homes as a first course of action rather than as the last option explored.40 Off
reserve, provincial child welfare policies follow best practices models that prioritize the best

36

See Loxley, Wien & Blackstock, supra note 20; Blackstock et al, supra note 20; Loxley et al, supra note 20; AG
Canada 2008 Report, supra note 20; AG Canada 2011 Report, supra note 20; Dr. Rose-Alma J. McDonald et al,
First Nations Child and Family Services Joint National Policy Review Final Report (Ottawa: Assembly of First
Nations and Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 2000); House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Public Accounts, Chapter 4, First Nations Child and Family Services Program – Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada of the May 2008 Report of the Auditor General (March 2009) (Chair: Shawn Murphy)
[House of Commons 2009 Report]; INAC, Government of Canada Response to the Report of the Standing
Committee on Public Accounts on Chapter 4, First Nations Child and Family Services Program – Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada of the May 2008 Report of the Auditor General (August 2009), online:
<ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-2/PACP/report-7/response-8512-402-43> [perma.cc/DS23-QNGG].
37
INAC, Fact Sheet – First Nations Child and Family Services (October 2006) at 1, cited in Caring Society, supra
note 2 at para 67.
38
INAC, First Nations Child and Family Services – National Program Manual (May 2005) at 6, cited in Caring
Society, supra note 2 at para 52.
39
Caring Society, supra note 2 at paras 122–148, 157, 217, 289, 306, 384, 387, 485.
40
Ibid at paras 168, 258, 344.
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interests of the child and the least disruptive measure as a guiding objective.41 The objective of
the FNCFS Program—culturally appropriate child and family services that are comparable to
those provided off reserve—was not here met; moreover, this outcome has been well
documented in joint AANDC/INAC reports since at least 2000.42 Here, the provision of funding
facilitated a model of service delivery discordant with the practices and regulations of provincial
child welfare; adverse effects were generated linked to race and/or national or ethnic origin.
These adverse effects built upon historical state practices of child removal and extended
generational damage.43
In the second instance, the Tribunal found that the narrow interpretation that
AANDC/INAC applied to Jordan’s Principal meant delays and denials of service for First
Nations children. Jordan’s Principle is:
a child-first principle and provides that where a government service is available to all
other children and a jurisdictional dispute arises between Canada and a
province/territory, or between departments in the same government regarding
services to a First Nations child, the government department of first contact pays for
the service and can seek reimbursement from the other government/department after
the child has received the service. It is meant to prevent First Nations children from
being denied essential public services or experiencing delays in receiving them.44
Inter-governmental disputes over funding (most of which are between federal departments) can
result in delays, denials, and children being put into care in order to access services, especially
where there are complex medical or care needs.45 The Federal Court in Pictou Landing Band
Council v Canada (Attorney General) found the approach taken by AANDC/INAC and Health
Canada to be exceedingly narrow, in that case for failing to reimburse a band council for inhome health care that would have been available under provincial social assistance policy. 46
Pictou Landing and the CHRT decision considered here underscore the importance of the final
issue outlined below: the failure to coordinate among departments and services, both within
AANDC/INAC and more generally as a matter of policy. The CHRT agreed with the Federal
Court in Pictou Landing when it suggested that “Jordan’s Principle is not an open-ended
principle. It requires complimentary social or health service be legally available to persons off
reserve. It also requires assessment of the services and costs to meet the need of the on reserve
First Nation child.”47
The issue of coordination and access to services goes beyond the purview of the FNCFS
Program. In a context where AANDC/INAC is not in compliance with child welfare provincial
standards, regulations, and funding, a watertight compartments approach (the FNCFS Program
funds x but not y) bureaucratizes a complex social problem. Comprehensive approaches and best
practices in child welfare at provincial levels include incorporating a range of social supports
41

Ibid at para 342.
Ibid at paras 150, 341–342, 347, 383, 393.
43
Ibid at paras 62, 66, 72, 73, 111, 123, and 125 specifically related to incentivizing child removal from family
homes.
44
Ibid at para 351 [emphasis in original].
45
Ibid at para 382.
46
Pictou Landing Band Council v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 342 [Pictou Landing].
47
Ibid at para 116, cited in Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 378.
42
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under the umbrella of these programs. AANDC/INAC’s assertion that funding is not a service
thus does not absolve it from responsibility. A lack of coordination among departments/agencies
and difficulty in accessing core and related services inform the finding of discrimination.

B. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND EQUALITY
Caring Society confronted the issue of substantive equality.48 It found that First Nations children
and families living on reserve were denied equal opportunity to child and family services
available to others. This finding raises a final related issue: the Crown’s fiduciary relationship
with Aboriginal peoples.
As will be elucidated further in section three below, federalism and interjurisdictional
disputes in social policy often involve shifting responsibility and blame for funding and action.
In Caring Society, the Tribunal queried the claim by the respondent that fiduciary duty principles
did not apply to this complaint.49 Following Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), the
Tribunal affirmed that the delegation of funding rather than legislating under applicable federal
statutes does not decrease AANDC/INAC’s constitutional responsibilities.50 The CHRT found
that “AANDC’s commitment to ensuring the safety and well-being of children and families
living on reserves and in Yukon must be considered in the context of the special relationship
48

Although this article does not focus on this point, the question of the requirements for making out discrimination
claims under human rights law is obviously critical. Legal scholars, and indeed Justice MacTavish in her Federal
Court ruling on the Caring Society CHRT case, raise concerns about the section 15 test for discrimination creeping
into human rights law. See Caring Society FC, supra note 10. In a careful review of the test for discrimination under
human rights legislation and the Charter, Koshan argues that “the test for discrimination under human rights
legislation should remain the traditional prima facie approach, unencumbered by extra requirements that may be
imported via section 15 of the Charter.” Among the reasons Koshan cites for her conclusion is access to justice,
noting that section 15 requirements impose a greater burden with “real financial, temporal, and outcome-based
consequences for the claimant pursuing a discrimination claim.” See Jennifer Koshan, “Under the Influence:
Discrimination Under Human Rights Legislation and Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 3:1 Can J of Human Rights
115 at 139, 140–41 [footnotes omitted]. See also Wayne MacKay, “The Marriage of Human Rights Codes and
Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: A Case for Greater Separation in Both Theory and Practice” (2013)
64 UNBLJ 54 at 97. Réaume extends this analysis, suggesting that “section 15 places the burden on the claimant to
prove that the legislation does indulge in stereotyping, whereas under the conventional approach to human rights
adjudication … the burden falls on respondents to prove that their generalizations are accurate.” See Leslie Réaume,
“Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory Human Rights Jurisprudence in the Age of the Charter” (2012)
9 JL & Equality 67 at 68–69. Mummé situates the tension—supplanting the O’Malley (prima facie) standard with
the formerly Law, now Kapp section 15 framework—as one in which constitutional analysis is adopted in order to
build room for deference to state decision making (see Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd
[1985] 2 SCR 536 [O’Malley]; Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 [Law];
and R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp]). Mummé raises questions about whether there is, or should be, a division
of labour between codes and the Charter (supra note 8 at 151). These conversations bear on the Caring Society case,
and others like it, moving forward for a number of reasons. Beyond financial and expediency considerations, there is
some support for the idea that the prima facie test for discrimination in a human rights setting is less burdensome to
meet than the section 15 test. The evidentiary flexibility of a tribunal and its scope in remedies are also important
reasons for seeking redress in this venue. Section 15 requirements, imported ad hoc into human rights settings, dilute
these benefits without necessarily adding either the clarity a proportionality test affords or setting broad precedent
about how equality would be satisfied.
49
Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 88.
50
Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 [Eldridge]; Caring Society, supra note 2 at
para 83.
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between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples;”51 thus it must, following Haida Nation v British
Columbia (Minister of Forests) (Haida Nation),52 act honourably. This sui generis53 relationship
is not limited to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.54 The duty of the Crown and fiduciary
relationships more generally have often been applied to cases involving land, which this case
does not.55 The Tribunal, following Frame v Smith, contended that a fiduciary duty could extend
to human and personal interests.56 Thus in this case, the Aboriginal interests relate not to land but
to culture and language, and the transmission of these generationally. These interests find
support in the Supreme Court decisions R v Coté and Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister
of Education). 57 Here, the potentially adversely affected interest is socio-cultural. Mingling
discrimination claims and fiduciary duty, the Tribunal’s ruling suggests that AANDC/INAC put
its budgetary and other interests ahead of those receiving support from the FNCFS Program and
thus met neither its fiduciary responsibilities nor provided equitable and sufficient support to
First Nations children on reserve and in the Yukon.
Relatedly, the issues raised in this decision regarding comparability or similarity of
circumstances show that despite their importance in human rights law, they may be limited
lenses with which to consider questions of equality in unique relationships between states and
historically subjected peoples. The normative liberal ideals of equality have a hollow translation
in social policy terms when applied to the sui generis relationship between governments and
Indigenous peoples.

II. FROM NEOLIBERALIZATION TO AUSTERITY IN SOCIAL
POLICY

51

Supra note 2 at para 87.
2004 SCC 73 [Haida Nation].
53
Significantly overlapping with Charter issues of substantive equality, Caring Society considered and recognized
the sui generis relationship of First Nations peoples in Canada, extending the Supreme Court’s analysis in Moore,
Withler, and Quebec v A that a mirror comparator group is not always needed or even useful. In Moore, the Court
reiterated that insistence on a mirror comparator group would subvert substantive equality and “risks perpetuating
the very disadvantage and exclusion from mainstream society the [Human Rights] Code is intended to remedy,”
concluding that the focus must not be on comparator groups, but “whether there is discrimination, period.” In
Quebec v A, Abella J for the majority confirmed that “a mirror comparator group analysis may fail to capture
substantive equality, may become a search for sameness, may shortcut the second stage of the substantive equality
analysis, and may be difficult to apply.” See Moore, supra note 28 at paras 30–31, 60; Quebec v A, supra note 28 at
para 346; and Withler, supra note 28.
54
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 35.
55
See R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507; R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075; Guerin v the Queen, [1984] 2 SCR
335; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 6; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 [Wewaykum].
56
Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 [Frame]; Caring Society, supra note 2 at paras 99–101.
57
R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139; Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 SCR 3. At
paragraph 104, the Tribunal in Caring Society found that the three criteria were met under the common law test for a
fiduciary duty from Elder Advocates Society, namely: (1) the fiduciary can exercise some power or discretion; (2) it
can exercise this discretion in a way that affects the recipient’s interests; and (3) the recipient is vulnerable to the
fiduciary holding power. See Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24 at para 27. The
respondents, in their factum and oral arguments in Caring Society, argued that because the interest asserted was not
a land interest as in Wewaykum, there was no fiduciary duty owed (see Wewaykum, supra note 55 at para 81, cited in
Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 96).
52
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The FNCFS Program was introduced in 1990. Beginning in earnest in the mid-1990s, the next
two decades were marked by significant tumult in Canadian social policy writ large; Canadian
social policy was subject to reform, retrenchment, instrumentalized investments, and austerity
measures. 58 In the 1990s in areas of federal jurisdiction, such as Employment Insurance and
transfers to provinces under a revamped cost-sharing arrangement for health, education, and
social services called the Canada Health and Social Transfer, budgetary restrictions and
heightened eligibility thresholds and criteria were introduced.59 Similarly, in 1995–96, a cap on
spending limited growth in AANDC/INAC (then Indian Affairs) budgets for core programs
(including child and family services) to 2 per cent per year. 60 By way of example, eligibility for
Employment Insurance decreased significantly after reforms were introduced in 1996, claimable
amounts were reduced, and certain groups of claimants, particularly women, had difficulty
qualifying under the new regime.61 A managerial model of service assessment and delivery—
sometimes called a new managerialism—was widely adopted in government and third
sector/not-for-profit practice.62 This model is nested in a discourse of efficiency and borrows
heavily from private sector management theory.63 It finds theoretical expression in a resurgence
and recalibration of classical liberal theory, often called neoliberalism.
The term neoliberalism is often imprecisely deployed to explain myriad practices and
processes.64 It originated in what has been called the Chicago school of economics, and was
popularized in the work of Milton Friedman and Freidrich von Hayek. Finding application first
in Latin America in the 1970s, neoliberalism came to be adopted in structural adjustment lending
policy conditions by international agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund in the 1980s, and in the policies and approaches of conservative governments in the United
States under Ronald Reagan and in the UK under Margaret Thatcher. 65 It became ubiquitous—
with variations and in hybridized forms—in most Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) nations in the 1990s, such that the approach came to be referred to as the
58

See Jane Jenson, “Historical Transformation of Canada’s Social Architecture: Institutions, Instruments, and Ideas”
in Keith Banting & John Myles, eds, Inequality and the Fading of Redistributive Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2013) 43; Rianne Mahon, “Childcare, New Social Risks, and the New Politics of Redistribution in Ontario” in ibid,
359.
59
See e.g. Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Jane Pulkingham, “Introduction: Going too Far? Feminist Public Policy in
Canada” in Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Jane Pulkingham, eds, Public Policy for Women: The State, Income Security,
and Labour Market Issues (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 3 at 19.
60
INAC Cost Drivers Study, From Poverty to Prosperity: Opportunities to Invest in First Nations Pre-Budget
Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, September 2007 (Ottawa: AFN, 2007)
[INAC Cost Drivers Study] cited in Judith Rae, “Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone or Quagmire for
First Nations?” (2009) 7:2 Indigenous LJ 1 at 27, n 107.
61
Martha MacDonald, “Income Security for Women: What About Employment Insurance?” in Cohen &
Pulkingham, eds, supra note 59, 251 at 254–58.
62
John Shields & Bryan Mitchell Evans, Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration “Reform”
(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1998) at 102.
63
See e.g. Bryan Evans, Ted Richmond & John Shields, "Structuring Neoliberal Governance: The Nonprofit Sector,
Emerging New Modes of Control and the Marketisation of Service Delivery" (2005) 24:1 Policy and Society 73.
64
Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015); Jaime
Peck, Nik Theodore & Neil Brenner, “Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great Recession” (2012)
111:2 South Atlantic Q 265; Simon Springer, “Fuck Neoliberalism” (2016) 15:2 ACME: An Intl J for Critical
Geographies 285.
65
See e.g. Kate Bezanson, Gender, the State and Social Reproduction: Household Insecurity in Neo-Liberal Times
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 25, 32 [Bezanson, Household Insecurity].
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Washington Consensus. 66 In economic terms, neoliberalism refers to a form of laissez-faire
liberal capitalism in which markets are viewed as the best vehicle for all distribution, and
social/regulatory conditions and limits (such as public assets and services) are viewed as
distortions. 67 Neoliberalism, however, is both economic theory and ideology; the latter is
insidious as its features are internalized at the state/third sector/institutional level and in
individual practice and belief. Some scholars thus use the term neoliberalization rather than
neoliberalism to reflect the transfer of ideology to practice at market/state and individual levels.68
Beyond terminological and conceptual shifts that redefine Keynesian citizens as neoliberal
consumers, this merit-based economic philosophy views structural disadvantage as a result of
individual failing. At the state and policy level, deregulation, increased financialization,
privatization of public services and assets, a fiscally constrained state, and reforms aimed at
disciplining and surveilling the poor take centre stage.69 Importantly, though, neoliberalism is not
about deregulation; rather it is a re-regulation that prizes market-based competition and is
cautious of redistribution via non-market means.
The period preceding the economic crisis of 2008 was marked by a social policy current
germane to the FNCFS Program: the rise of the social investment state in Canada and
elsewhere. 70 Departing from earlier Washington Consensus neoliberal approaches, this social
investment perspective is one in which human capital and often anti-poverty promoting policies
are developed by international agencies and third-way governments (usually centrist and centreleft). It marks an often instrumental deployment of a softened neoliberalism in social policy.
Strategic investment in certain social policy areas expanded from the mid-1990s to 2008 in many
Canadian provinces/territories and at certain points federally. These expansions were usually tied
to a specific new managerialism model.71 Strategic investment approaches often transfer social
risks from society to the individual and tend to increase performance reporting requirements such
as cost efficiency exercises or workfare-type policies (parts of neoliberal practice). Such
practices often make all levels of government and agencies receiving funding leaner in both
staffing and resources.72
Two additional features of neoliberalism are particularly relevant to Caring Society. First,
this form of economic liberalism and concomitant social practice is adaptable and versatile,
despite its noted instability.73 Second, one of the features of neoliberal governance in Canada at
federal, provincial/territorial, and municipal levels over the last twenty-five years has been a
66

See e.g. Alfredo Saad-Filho, “Growth, Poverty and Inequality: From Washington Consensus to Inclusive Growth”
(2010) United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs Working Paper No 100, online:
<un.org/esa/desa/papers/2010/wp100_2010.pdf> [perma.cc/NM9L-47PV].
67
David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 64–65.
68
See Peck, Theodore & Brenner, supra note 64.
69
See Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Governance of Social Insecurity (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2009); Bezanson, Household Insecurity, supra note 65.
70
On social investment, see Jane Jenson, “The LEGO™ Paradigm and New Social Risks: Consequences for
Children” in Jane Lewis, ed, Children, Changing Families and Welfare States (London: Edward Elgar Publishing,
2006) 27. On financialization, see Malcolm Sawyer, “What is Financialization?” (2013) 42:4 Intl J of Political
Economy 5 at 9.
71
See ibid; Mahon, supra note 58.
72
Banting & Myles, supra note 58 at 19.
73
For a good discussion of the 2008 economic crisis and its relationship to neoliberal capitalism, see Stephen
McBride, Rianne Mahon & Gerard Boychuk, eds, After ’08: Social Policy and the Global Financial Crisis
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).
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general trend toward a centralized decentralization. Here, control and decision-making power
over programs and services is often centralized to one level of government, but the day-to-day
delivery is increasingly delegated to other levels of government, third-sector/not-for-profit
agencies, or sold or shared with private enterprise. A delegated welfare state model exists
alongside a recentring of control in departments and ministries of finance and executive bodies
such as the Privy Council Office.74
The adaptability of neoliberalism as economic theory and as social practice is well
documented. 75 The period following the economic crisis of 2008 was briefly marked by
significant infrastructure investments as economy boosting measures, but was swiftly followed
by a renewed neoliberal economic approach under austerity measures. 76 Some scholars and
policy analysts have claimed that austerity measures, brought about by the near-collapse of many
national economies owing to the deregulation of financial markets and sectors characteristic of
neoliberalism, are a form of “neoliberalism 3.0.” 77 Owing to significant budget shortfalls
stemming from economic malaise, neoliberalism 3.0 or austerity has resulted in cuts in social and
other spending, particularly for provinces and territories that have responsibility for most social
programming. The tasks related to providing services, particularly in areas such as social
assistance and income supports, and child welfare and prevention services, are thus made more
challenging in such a context. As the FNCFS Program is meant to both comply with provincial
standards and legislation and is meant to be reasonably comparable to services available off
reserve, the provincial/territorial climate flavours the AANDC/INAC provision of services. It is
also subject to its own budgetary regimes. Moreover, until 2015, the federal government
followed an austerity approach to budgeting and social policy delivery. 78 Although there was
significant joint reporting and external assessment of the problems with the FNCFS Program
beginning in the early 2000s, coupled with the findings of the 1996 Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples and the 2015 Truth and Reconciliation report, the broader institutional and
bureaucratic political structure retained funding based on formula and population, rather than
based on needs.79 The context of neoliberal managerialism and then austerity also meant that
74

On delegated social policy, see Kimberly J Morgan & Andrea Louise Campbell, The Delegated Welfare State:
Medicare, Markets and the Governance of Social Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). On the
changing control of distributive policies, see David A Good, “The New Bureaucratic Politics of Redistribution”
[Good, “Bureaucratic Politics”] in Banting & Myles, supra note 58, 210.
75
For popular works on the subject, see Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism
(Toronto: AA Knopf Canada, 2007). See also Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, translated by
Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). Notable academic sources
include: Jaime Peck, “Explaining (with) Neoliberalism” (2013) 1:2 Territory, Politics, Governance 132.
76
See the annual series How Ottawa Spends, available at www.carleton.ca. See e.g. Michael J. Prince, “The
Hobbesian Prime Minister and the Night Watchman State: Social Policy Under the Harper Conservatives” in G.
Bruce Doern & Christopher Stoney, eds, How Ottawa Spends, 2012-2013: The Harper Majority, Budget Cuts, and
the New Opposition (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) 53. The most recent series is: G. Bruce
Doern & Christopher Stoney, eds, How Ottawa Spends 2016-2017: The Trudeau Liberals in Power online: Carleton
University Faculty of Public Affairs <carleton.ca/sppa/wp-content/uploads/How-Ottawa-Spends-2016-2017.pdf>
[perma.cc/W688-69ND].
77
See Riejer Hendrikse & James Sidaway, “Neoliberalism 3.0”, Commentary, (2010) 42:9 Environment and
Planning A 2037. See also Stephen McBride, “Neoliberalism in Question?” in McBride, Mahon & Boychuk, supra
note 73, 21.
78
Doern & Stoney, supra note 76.
79
See supra note 20; Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Gathering Strength, vol 3 (Ottawa:
Communications Group—Publishing, 1996); Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the Future: Summary of the Final
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other social services were streamlined and reassessed so the effects of cuts in social spending
were cumulative, and felt acutely for vulnerable, low income, and marginalized populations.80
Significantly, although with some variation depending on philosophical orientation, provincial
and federal governments enacting neoliberal practices often reflect neoliberalism’s hostility to
equity claims.81
The final feature of the neoliberal period that is relevant to the Caring Society decision
relates to centralized decentralization/delegation. In social policy development and funding,
especially at the federal level, planning, analysis, and decision-making often occur in a
centralized and often fragmented, incremental fashion.82 David Good notes that:
The focus of redistributive policy making is increasingly central agency (PMO, PCO,
and Department of Finance) centred and driven as a basis for strategically positioning
issues, designing programs, and managing political conflict. The Department of
Finance is undertaking the policy analysis and design, bypassing social departments,
drawing directly upon pre-selected think tanks and external advisors, and engaging
directly with provincial governments on the redistributive and other aspects of tax
and expenditure proposals.83
This centralization of policy control, often framed in budgetary rather than program specific
processes, has meant that adjusting policies, particularly their funding levels, is more difficult as
bureaucrat experts in the area may not be direct participants in planning. Although political will
matters enormously, twinned with a culture of austerity and accountability, effecting funding and
policy changes (absent legal compulsion to do so) has been often ineffective.
The other side of centralization is decentralization.84 Decentralization can have salubrious
and important effects: local delivery of a service by those who know an issue and community,
and in this case, can provide vital culturally appropriate services. Yet in a context of widespread
new managerialism and financialization of social policy, this decentralization can make it
exceptionally challenging to deliver services.85 In Caring Society, this is evident in a range of
areas such as the funding choices that incentivized child removal and a lack of supports for
compliance, reporting, and auditing requirements. The increase in the number of FNCFS
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, (Ottawa: TRCC, 2015) at 189–90.
80
In my own research in the 1990s and 2000s on changes in taxation policies and in social spending in Ontario
during a period of neoliberal retrenchment, the effects of such changes were compounding, especially since those
requiring certain services were often recipients of services funded by another ministry or agency (e.g. health services
and social assistance). See Bezanson, Household Insecurity, supra note 65. See also Ronald Labonté & Arne
Ruckert, “Austerity Lite: Social Determinants of Health under Canada’s Neo-Liberal Capture” in McBride, Mahon
& Boychuk, supra note 73, 272.
81
See e.g. Bezanson, “Mad Men Social Policy”, supra note 4; Ann Porter, “Neo-Conservatism, Neo-Liberalism and
Canadian Social Policy: Challenges for Feminism” (2012) 29:3 Canadian Woman Studies 19.
82
Good, “Bureaucratic Politics”, supra note 74.
83
Ibid at 216.
84
Decentralization is sometimes also called devolution. See Rae, supra note 60.
85
Devolution can also be a deliberate and duplicitous cost saving measure. Rae recalls: “In the mid-80s, a leaked
memo from the Mulroney government urged further devolution of ‘community management’ to Bands—under strict
funding caps—as a strategy to cut federal spending. The memo, strongly reminiscent of the White Paper, also
recommended the transfer of as many expenditures as possible to provinces, the privatization of Indian land, and the
complete elimination of the department of Indian Affairs.” Ibid at 15.

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018

166

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 28 [2018], Art. 8

agencies operating on reserves in Canada is essential; the decentralization, however, absent
coordination among federal departments and with provincial departments, and absent adequate
funding, resources, support, and infrastructure, shifts the responsibility for service provision to
providers without also providing robust capacity to deliver services and comply with regulatory
and reporting regimes.86
The FNCFS Program came into being at the beginning of a process of retrenchment and
restraint in social policy in Canada. As this process unfolded, its characteristics—managerialism,
decentralization, financialization, and at times, indifference to issues of social inequality—
informed the struggles for appropriate and adequate funding for child and family welfare on
reserves. The ubiquity of neoliberal processes in almost all policy portfolios meant that other
supports such as health care were also subject to such regimes, compounding inequities. I turn
now to an examination of the interplay between the necessities of life and the social policies that
touch on the Caring Society decision.

III. INDIGENOUS CHILD WELFARE AND SOCIAL
REPRODUCTION: TENSIONS AND THRESHOLD EFFECTS
At the outset of this paper, I suggested that Caring Society is fundamentally about how people
put together and sustain the necessities of life; it concerns a contest over social reproduction.
What is social reproduction? Like neoliberalism, social reproduction is at times imprecisely
deployed to reference caring labours. In feminist political economy usage, social reproduction
refers to the processes and practices involved in maintaining and reproducing people on a daily
and generational basis. 87 The ways in which this occurs vary historically and culturally, but
always involve putting together the necessities of life, including shelter, food, culture, intimacy,
affection, socialization, and security, among others. 88 As I have argued elsewhere, social
reproduction involves:
the day to day work of maintaining and reproducing people and their labour power,
including creating space for the building of their capacities such as learning,
caretaking, and playing ... It often involves internalizing and coping with
discrimination and racism [and] is usually carried out in homes and involves the
teaching of social norms, which are social assets and which are integral in
coordinating the activities of an economy ... It involves negotiations over power and
resources within households, usually between men and women ... It is often
characterized by an unequal division of labour and a gender-specific socialization
process. It also includes provisioning beyond individual households, through
volunteer work, intra-household care work, and local initiatives pertaining to shared
86

For an insightful review of neoliberalism, shifting responsibilities for services, and the Australian child welfare
system, see Chris Cunneen, “Surveillance, Stigma, Removal: Indigenous Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice in the
Age of Neoliberalism” (2015) 19:1 Austrl Indigenous L Rev 32.
87
Barbara Laslett & Johanna Brenner, “Gender and Social Reproduction: Historical Perspectives” (1989) 15:1
Annual Rev Sociology 381 at 382; see also Kate Bezanson & Meg Luxton, eds, Social Reproduction: Feminist
Political Economy Challenges Neoliberalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
88
Bezanson, “Return of the Nightwatchman State?”, supra note 3 at 31.
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social space or services. Social reproduction involves pooled risk services and
programs, such as getting access to income via citizenship-based entitlements such as
those which have been provided through the welfare state ... In short, social
reproduction encompasses the work that must be done in order to ensure that people
at least survive and ideally thrive and develop as well as to ensure that the economic
system is perpetuated.89
Social reproduction is thus dynamic and is in tension, in capitalist economies, with the aim of
profit maximization.90 It requires mediation at a number of levels, especially by states, families
and households, and to different extents, markets.91 States, for example, can take on some of the
mediation by underwriting certain costs and supports, such as health care. These costs and
supports can also be left to markets to provide for a price, to the third sector to provide as
charity, or they can be shifted to families (and usually women within them) to provide via their
own labours. The latter is usually the cheapest way for these costs and services to be met, often
through a discourse of obligation and care. Yet such mediation requires the creation and
stabilization of class, gender, and racialized orders; neoliberal capitalism, and in the case under
review, white settler neocolonialized versions which follow ready conduits of inequality in
assigning social reproduction and its corollary order. The familiar version of the post-Fordist
compact is an easy illustration of a short-lived entente between regimes of capital accumulation
and social reproduction. 92 In this post-war compromise, capital accepted limits on profit
accumulation in exchange for a labour accord held broadly in place by a rigid gender accord in
which almost exclusively white men aspired to, though did not always achieve, a family wage.
This compact consolidated a division of labour in the work of social reproduction done in homes,
although it was significantly bolstered by an emergent Keynesian welfare state that underwrote
certain processes and tasks. These class, gender, and racialized orders required mediation and to
different extents repression, whether in the form of direct suppression and state violence, in the
form of legal structures that denied access to reproductive freedom, or in the over-incarceration,
denial of services to and/or surveillance of poor or racialized groups.93 In the case of Indigenous
peoples in Canada, it took racist expression in, among other things, residential schools whose
ostensible aim was to resocialize children into white settler culture and to destroy the capacities
for social reproduction in communities.
The work of social reproduction requires material inputs. These can come from multiple
sources including wages, subsistence, rent, income transfers from governments, gifts and charity,
barter, and more indirect pooled risk transfers and credits such as tax credits or childcare
subsidies. These inputs are transformed, often via women’s labour, into material necessities and
goods. But it also requires affective, social, and cultural inputs.94 States play a significant role in
establishing the conditions under which social reproduction, including its social and cultural
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dimensions, takes place.95 They do this via their roles in regulating capital, labour markets, social
policy and welfare state entitlements, and in enforcing obligations within families.96 The work of
social reproduction is thus often rendered invisible; we tend to recognize and name it when it
fails: a child taken into care, generational cycles of abuse, violence and incarceration, and youth
suicide among others. Failure to invest in households and families reveals threshold effects on
care economies, and is often expressed in higher spending in corrections. Beyond paying for in
the justice system what might be more wisely invested in social services, crises in social
reproduction ripple beyond the micro household experience of depletion. As Elson argues in
relation to macroeconomic policy, the domestic, the economic, and the political are
interconnected and rely on one another:
We have identified three sectors: the domestic, the private and the public; and three
circuits: the market, the tax-and-benefit circuit and the communications network. We
have argued that the domestic sector produces a labour force; and, more than that,
plays a foundational role in the production of people who possess not only the
capacity to work but also to acquire other more intangible social assets—a sense of
ethical behaviour, a sense of citizenship, a sense of what it is to communicate—all of
which permit the forming and sustaining of social norms. We have argued that,
without these intangible social assets, the three circuits could not function with any
degree of regularity or continuity.97
The lens of social reproduction, particularly when it is applied in concert with an understanding
of neoliberalization, brings important clarity to Caring Society. Three intertwined aspects merit
closer consideration. First, federalism is in this case an expression of social reproduction and can
be viewed as producing a kind of constitutionally derived havoc. Second, a crisis of care,
including related to fiduciary duties, animates this case. Here, funding levels, discrimination, and
new managerial bureaucratic practices extend the risk and effects of a loss of cultural, affective,
and familial social reproduction. Finally, a lack of coordination among departments and
ministries as expressed most starkly in Jordan’s Principle compartmentalizes and can deny
substantive tools to enable positive social reproduction.
It is easy to forget, in the abstractions of policy and funding directives, discussions of
forms of capital accumulation and regulation, and theoretical abstractions of social reproduction
theory, that the case under consideration is principally about children, families, and their
wellbeing.98 Rae argues that:
Research has found that poverty, poor housing and parental substance abuse—far
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more than physical or sexual abuse—are the top three reasons First Nation families
enter the child welfare system. These structural issues go far beyond child protection
programming, and touch on the drivers of poverty including lack of education, the
federal funding cuts to housing and infrastructure on reserve, and the weak
availability of high quality and appropriate health and cultural services to help
communities heal from addictions and associated trauma.99
These structural issues are principally the creatures of provinces. Scholars such as Barbara
Cameron have made a case for understanding the constitutional divisions of responsibilities in
sections 91 and 92 within a framework of social reproduction.100 She traces the ways in which
assigning responsibilities for economic development powers to the federal government and those
related to private matters, or “local works and undertakings,” 101 to provinces created a
framework in which the messy work of caring for people evolved into being a kind of division of
social reproduction. She notes that the “1867 division of power assigned ‘Indians and lands
reserved for Indians’ to the federal government, a power that it has exercised historically to
destroy the material basis for the social reproduction of Aboriginal peoples.” 102 Returning to
children and families, the evolution of this original constitutional framework nests the bulk of
welfare state architecture—health care, education, childcare, child welfare, housing, and so on—
with provinces. Labour and environmental regulations are also part of a broad social
reproduction frame.103 The conditions, inputs into, and regulation of social reproduction, where
taken up by states, is often carried out at the provincial level. Provinces, one scholar of
multilevel governance notes, “have women” because they have social services; this is equally so
for children and families.104
The messiness of the Caring Society decision reflects a contest over social reproduction,
where the provinces “have” children and families jurisdictionally and legislatively, but the
federal government circumscribes the inputs into the funding and quality of that support. In an
inversion of other policy areas, the federal government here “has” social reproduction. The 2009
Standing Committee on Public Accounts reflected on this problem:
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it should be possible to compare the level of funding provided to First Nations child
and family services to similar provincial agencies, and given their unique and
challenging circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect First Nations agencies to
receive a higher level of funding. Yet, when asked how the funding for First Nations
child and family service agencies compares to agencies for non-natives, the Assistant
Deputy Minister said, “I'm sorry, but we don't know the answer.” The same question
was put to the Deputy Minister and he replied, “Our accountability is for the services
delivered by those agencies to the extent that we fund them.”105
This constitutional arrangement, a kind of race-to-the-bottom approach that shifts responsibility
for substantiveness and culpability for inadequacies, provincializes and familializes social
reproduction. Such bureaucratic reasoning, coupled with a neoliberal devolutionary
managerialism, frustrates and evades equality claims. Failing to meaningfully invest in
prevention and household infrastructures (including their affective, material, and cultural
capacities) encourages crises of care. This jurisdictional contest over social reproduction led the
Standing Committee on Public Accounts to reflect: “Quite frankly, one has to ask why a program
goes on for 20 years, the world changes around it, and yet the formula stays the same,
preventative services aren’t funded, and all these children are being put into care.”106
The fiduciary and possibly Haida Nation duty107 owed to Indigenous people stemming
from a sui generis relationship is here squarely related to multi-generational interests; beyond
language and cultural transmission, Caring Society forms part of a conversation about a need for
disproportionate culturally appropriate resource investment and control over social reproduction
in First Nations communities on reserve. Such investment is multilayered, and requires a broad
conception of inputs into social reproduction to address the structural and historical basis of
crises in social reproduction. “We believe,” the Auditor General of Canada noted in 2011, “that
there have been structural impediments to improvement in living conditions on First Nations
reserves.”108 “Real improvement,” they continued:
… will depend on clarity about services levels, a legislative base for programs,
commensurate statutory funding instead of reliance on policy and contribution
agreements, and organizations that support service delivery by First Nations. All four
are needed before conditions on reserves will approach those existing elsewhere
across Canada.109
The profiles of First Nations families differ dramatically to non-First Nations families, and while
not enforceable, the conclusions of the Tribunal acknowledge that disproportionate need is best
tied to disproportionate and coordinated investments in supports for social reproduction.110 This
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is most starkly articulated in the jurisdictional disputes over funding and services seen in the
narrow application of Jordan’s Principle.
The lens of social reproduction reveals the ways in which crises of care are mediated,
taken up, and delegated. Combined with an understanding of neoliberal approaches and
practices, it illuminates the shifting of costs, responsibility, and blame among levels of
government, to local communities and agencies, and to families. This lens has the potential to
alter a legal lens that must answer questions of equality and discrimination to one that also asks
how Indigenous interests and equity are best served.

IV. CONCLUSION: RECOGNITION, REDRESS, AND
RECONCILIATION? MOVING BEYOND CRISES IN CARE
Among the most important elements of Caring Society is its confirmation both that children and
families on reserve have been discriminated against in the provision of child and family services
(recognition of harm) and that redress is also material: increased and coordinated funding. It
acknowledged that there may be a fiduciary duty owed in cases of discrimination and inequality,
with implications for cases and situations well outside of land based claims. The decision
anchored historical practices including residential schools and the sixties scoop, along with
consistently documented under-resourcing of social and infrastructure services, to the current
crisis tendencies in social reproduction on many reserves. The escalation of these crisis
tendencies can be traced in part to neoliberal logics in policy formation and in a discursive frame
that individualizes blame for structural social problems. Culturally appropriate service provision
on the part of First Nations agencies is critical to addressing some of the most egregious features
of the FNCFS Program; yet such control cannot resolve the features of miscoordination, funding
shortfalls, and paternalism that stem from AANDC/INAC, and to some extent provincial,
practices. Federalism, neoliberal governance, and social reproduction are thus central to this
case.
Caring Society suffers from a range of lingering questions, confusions and implementation
struggles, and delays.111 The Tribunal missed an opportunity to affirm a systemic remedy that
for prevention, AANDC [INAC]’s funding formulas provide an incentive to remove children from
their homes as a first resort rather than as a last resort. For some FNCFS Agencies, especially those
under Directive 20-1, their level of funding makes it difficult if not impossible to provide prevention
and least disruptive measures. Even under the EPFA, where separate funding is provided for
prevention, the formula does not provide adjustments for increasing costs over time for such things as
salaries, benefits, capital expenditures, cost of living, and travel. This makes it difficult for FNCFS
Agencies to attract and retain staff and, generally, to keep up with provincial requirements. Where the
assumptions built into the applicable funding formulas in terms of children in care, families in need
and population levels are not reflective of the actual needs of the First Nation community, there is
even less of a possibility for FNCFS Agencies to keep pace with provincial operational requirements
that may include … costs for legal or band representation, insurance premiums, and changes to
provincial/territorial service standards (ibid at para 344).
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might touch on some of the inputs into social reproduction, such as the remedy delivered in CN v
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) (Action Travail). 112 The Action Travail case
addressed the need for disproportionate investments based on need, and socioeconomic and
historical impact:
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled Canadian National Railway Co. (CNR)
had discriminated against women in its hiring practices for certain types of front line
railway positions (so-called ‘blue-collar’ jobs), otherwise thought to be the work of
men. As part of a comprehensive remedial order, the Tribunal required at least onein-four new employees hired by CNR for ‘blue-collar’ positions be filled by a
woman until the overall employment rate at CNR reached thirteen percent – the
national percentage at the time of women working in equivalent jobs elsewhere. The
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the Tribunal’s decision.113
Such an approach, nested in disproportionate investment to remedy historical inequalities, in
concert with an eye to a self-governing solution for the myriad issues plaguing areas beyond
child welfare and service coordination within INAC’s jurisdiction, could have a broad and
salutary reconciliatory reach.
The Tribunal’s assessment of discrimination is one that underscores the need for a
nuanced legislative, policy, and legal approach to social reproduction as a lens to build a
reconciliation culture. Investing in the conditions that not only allow people to survive but to
thrive is a social and forward-looking process. The changes required by the Tribunal of
AANDC/INAC are significant, but its scope is necessarily narrowly construed and thus cannot
substantively address the amalgam of inputs into the conditions for social reproduction. The
latter requires considered legislative and political will, good will, and an openness to a kind of
rebuilding of comprehensive policies that may well give greater space for autonomy over social
policy remedies and practices. Unique relationships require new solutions that do not deplete
existing capacities, but that meet the aim of supporting children and their families so that they
might have childhoods from which they do not need to recover.114
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